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Employment growth could reduce violence during civil conflicts.  To determine if increased employment
affects violence we analyzed varying employment in development programs run by different US military
divisions in Iraqi districts.  Employment levels vary with funding periods and the military division
in charge.  Controlling for variability between districts, we find that a 10% increase in labor-related
spending generates a 15-20% decline in labor-intensive insurgent violence. Overall the 10% spending
increase is associated with a nearly 10% violence reduction, due to reduction in attacks which kill
civilians, but increased attacks against the military. These findings indicate that labor-intensive development
programs can reduce violence during insurgencies.
Radha Iyengar























In recent years there has been a renewed interest in understanding the relationship 
between economic development and violence in the context of terrorism and insurgencies. 
The United States and its allies have been fighting protracted insurgencies in Iraq and 
Afghanistan for nearly a decade and every aspect of U.S. strategy, doctrine, and tactics - from 
calls to “take the gloves off” to increasing reconstruction and steps to win the loyalty of the 
population – have been the subject of debate. For both the United States and states at risk of 
civil war, a major security issue is ending insurgent violence and restoring legitimate 
governmental authority.  Given the persistence of civil conflict in many regions and the 
adverse consequences these conflicts have on economic development and security, a key 
question is the extent to which external interventions in the form of development and 
reconstruction programs can reduce insurgent violence. 
Despite the importance of better understanding the connection between economic 
development and civil violence, the existing empirical evidence regarding the efficacy of 
different counterinsurgency strategies is limited.  With few exceptions, research has focused 
on the military response to an insurgency, with differing views regarding the extent to which 
the local population should be protected (a “hearts and minds” model) versus treated harshly 
for any perceived support of insurgent activity (a deterrence model). These models differ in 
the extent to which insurgency is an entity distinct from existing social and economic 
conditions.  Separately, focus on development has typically studied the feasibility of 
establishing well-functioning markets or improving the delivery of social services.  There are 
few studies that have evaluated the relationship between changes in legal labor-market 
conditions and violence during insurgencies. Thus, despite the economic intuition that 
“boosting the economic returns for staying on the right side of the law, [as a] ‘carrot’ might 
dramatically alter the cost-benefit calculation facing potential criminals and rebels," military 
strategy and economic activity have been largely separate in policy debate and scholarly 
research.
1    
We begin to determine the relationship between these issues by evaluating the impact 
of improving economic conditions, and specifically the impact of labor-generating 
reconstruction activities on the production of violence by insurgent organizations.  Using a 
                                                 
1 Fisman and Miguel (2008, 189-190). The U.S. military has incorporated this view into its revised 
counterinsurgency strategy.  See The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) and 
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (2009).   4
model of labor supply and violence production, we show that the greater availability of 
outside options in the legal (i.e., non-violent) labor market may reduce the total person-hours 
available to the insurgency. The rank-and-file individuals that make up an insurgent 
organization may choose to participate in insurgent activity for a combination of different 
reasons, including an intellectual or an emotional (i.e. psychological) commitment to an 
insurgency and its cause, or  by a comparison of economic options. By improving the 
employment market in the non-violent sector, job creation may create higher opportunity 
costs for individuals to participate in violent insurgent activities, and thus raise the cost of 
labor for insurgent groups. We find that improvements in the labor market options in the non-
violent sector through reconstruction projects may be associated not only with reduced 
insurgent recruiting, but also with insurgent groups substituting away from labor-intensive 
forms of violence and towards more capital-intensive attacks. Insurgent groups may also 
become more radical, changing the tactics and targets they choose, thus affecting the total 
levels of violence.  This  insight, obtained by a combination of theoretical analysis and 
empirical data,  provides a new view into the complex  economic impact  of the  choice 
between participating in an insurgency or participating in the non-violent work force.    
To empirically identify the relationship between labor market conditions and violence 
levels we used variation in reconstruction generated by the Commander’s Emergency 
Response Program (CERP) in Iraq from between early 2004 and the end of 2008. Due to the 
decentralized administration of CERP, there has been tremendous variation across military 
units in how CERP funds have been used.
2 Using variation in spending on CERP projects at 
the division level of the U.S. Army and Marines, as well as variation in the total amount of 
funding authorized for CERP itself, we investigate the effect of labor intensive projects on 
the level and type of insurgent violence in the various parts of Iraq.  
Using this variation to estimate the impact of reconstruction projects raises several 
concerns. Spending on labor-intensive projects is not independent of other factors related to 
violence and so a linear regression of spending on violence levels will tend to be biased by 
unobserved factors which drive both spending and violence, as well potential reverse 
causation.  The empirical strategy relies on the fact that from 2004 to 2008, variation in the 
use of CERP funds was related to both the varying preferences or structures of different 
military units and the amount of overall funding authorized by Congress. We use a 
difference-in-differences based instrument which compares divisions in high and low CERP 
                                                 
2 On the variation in COIN tactics between U.S. military units, see Kahl (2007). For journalistic accounts of the 
lack of a clear COIN doctrine in the early years of the war, see Gordon and Trainor (2006).   5
funding periods.  The strategy relies on increases in CERP-generated employment by labor-
project preferring divisions during periods when more CERP funding available relative to 
periods when less funding is available.  This is compared to employment in capital-project 
preferring divisions during high and low funding periods. The identifying assumption is that 
all other differences in the determinants of violence (including other counterinsurgency 
practices) are fixed between different military divisions over time, when controlling for 
district fixed effects.   
Based on this evidence, we find that a greater fraction of spending devoted to labor-
intensive projects (e.g., those projects that create employment opportunities for Iraqis) is 
associated with a decrease in violence.  An additional 10 percent spent on employment is 
associated with an approximately 10% reduction in violence.  This reduction appears to be 
due to a decrease in attacks on civilian targets, but masks an increase in attacks on more 
hardened military targets.  In addition, we find that, consistent with the labor-capital 
substitution theory, a 10 percent increase in labor-related spending generates a 15-20 percent 
decline in labor-intensive forms of insurgent violence, although a small increase in the rate of 
deaths per attack remains. 
The study provides a  new conceptual basis for integrating crime economics, 
insurgency economics, and developmental economics.
3   Consistent with previous work in 
crime economics on the relationship between unemployment and crime, we find a clear 
substitution between the legal or nonviolent and illegal or violent sectors.  This finding 
suggests that insurgent groups must rely on individuals with a marginal attachment to their 
groups to produce a high level of violence.  This also provides evidence that in communities 
with relatively few economic opportunities, the introduction of legal or non-violent labor 
markets can have dramatic effects on aggregate illegal or violent activity. 
 This  study contributes to a growing literature on the effectiveness of development 
and reconstruction in conflict settings.  A recent paper by Berman, Callen, Felter and Shapiro 
(2011) finds that the provision of public services can reduce violence by providing an 
alternative to insurgent-provided public goods and services.
4  That study emphasized the flow 
of information from civilian groups to the government and the role such information flow 
plays in affecting violence. This study complements these findings on information flow by 
                                                 
3 In the economics literature on the social determinants of criminal activity, see Becker (1968) and Glaeser 
(1998). Arguments about the effect of economic deprivation and grievance in motivating individuals to 
participate in rebellions are also prominent in the civil war literature. See Miguel and Fisman (2008); Collier 
(2008); Humphreys and Weinstein (2008); Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004); and Fearon and Laitin 
(2003). 
4 On this “club goods” model, see also Berman and Laitin (2008) and Berman (2009).   6
focusing on economic choices involved in the production of violence.  The labor market 
mechanism in previous literature is often treated as unidimensional, affecting only the time 
availability of participants, rather than multi-dimensional, affecting both the input costs and 
organizational composition of insurgent groups.  Analysis integrating these multiple  effects 
indicate  that development and reconstruction can be a powerful and cost-effective tool to 
reduce violence both in the short-term, due to the increasing the opportunity cost to 
individuals for participating in the insurgency, and in over the long-term, due to the economic 
and legitimacy benefits that follow from improvements in government-provided public 
goods.   
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out a theoretical framework for 
understanding how labor market conditions affect an individual’s decision to participate in 
insurgent activity. Section 3 discusses our data sources on military and civilian casualties in 
Iraq, CERP disbursements, and U.S. force rotations. Section 4 presents our results and 
analysis. Section 5 the places the conclusions from this study in the context of the current 
literature on the economics of crime, conflict, and development. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The relationship between legal labor markets and crime is intuitively plausible and 
has formed the basis of much of the economics of crime research, beginning with Becker 
(1968) and Ehrlich (1973).  Despite the long history of research on this question, empirical 
evidence supporting a causal effect of employment rates, legal sector wages, or other 
measures of legal markets on criminal activity has been difficult to isolate.  This is because 
there is complex set of personal, social, and economic factors that influence the propensity to 
engage in criminal activities, making it difficult to identify the effect of labor market 
conditions.  As a result, existing empirical evidence on this question is mixed.  Some 
sociological studies suggest a  weak relationship between unemployment and crime (Chirico 
1987; Entorf and Spengler 2000).  On the other hand, economists have found evidence for a 
causal relationship between labor market conditions and crime rates (Grogger, 1998; Gould, 
Weinberg, and Mustard, 2001; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001).   
Some have applied a parallel reasoning relating labor market opportunities to the 
ability of insurgent or terrorist groups to produce violence (Krueger and Maleckova 2003;   7
Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor 2010).
5  Individuals who might be recruited by insurgent 
groups face a similar choice between participating in violent insurgent activity or seeking 
employment in the non-violent sector, and may be less likely to participate in violent 
insurgent activity as the opportunity costs for foregoing employment in the non-violent sector 
increase. While the empirical evidence for this is limited, many scholars, policymakers, and 
military officials have accepted this logic. The 2007 U.S. counterinsurgency field manual 
cites strengthening the local economy and generating employment as an important part of an 
effective counterinsurgency campaign: “Unemployed males of military age may join the 
insurgency to provide for their families. Hiring these people for public works projects…can 
remove the economic incentive to join the insurgency.”
6 Others argue that military-led 
reconstruction programs may have the opposite effect and instead increase insurgent 
violence, either because the increased presence and visibility of military forces in local 
communities required to manage reconstruction may further antagonize insurgent forces, or 
because civilians who are employed in these projects may be subject to increased 
intimidation and violence because they are more observable to insurgent agents.
7  To our 
knowledge there is no systematic evidence on the effects of development and reconstruction 
spending, and its role in improving non-violent sector employment conditions, on the size of 
the available labor pool for insurgent organizations.
8   
   We have developed a theoretical model to identify and characterize the economic 
factors that affect the impact  of development spending on insurgent violence. The theoretical 
model has three actors: individuals who decide whether to participate or not, insurgent groups 
who decide how much violence and what the mix of violent acts should be (whether to attack 
“hard” targets (military forces) or “soft” targets (unprotected civilians)), and the U.S. military 
who by funding development projects decide how much labor to purchase.  The interaction 
proceeds as follows:  The U.S. military acts first leaving a labor supply of individuals for the 
insurgency, then insurgent groups set the equilibrium wages in the insurgent sector, and then 
individuals.  
                                                 
5 A commonly used definition describes insurgencies as “a protracted political-military activity directed toward 
completely or partially controlling the resources of the country through the use of irregular military forces and 
illegal political mobilization” (CIA n.d.). 
6 The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM No. 3-24), p. 173.. 
7 A different mechanism through which reconstruction may actually increase violence, raised by Berman, 
Shapiro, and Felter (2009), is that raising employment levels reduces the ability of counterinsurgents to purchase 
information about illegal activities directly from local community, allowing insurgent networks to operate more 
freely. See also Wilder and Stuart (2009); Wilder (2009); and Bradbury and Kleinman (2010).  
8 Felter, Shapiro, and Berman (2008) present evidence for a different mechanism by which reconstruction and 
economic assistance programs might reduce insurgent violence (the provision of public goods).   8
 
2.1  Individual Participation in Insurgent Activity 
To formalize the effect of the legal labor market on an individual’s decision to participate in 
insurgent activities, we consider a model of labor supply and time allocation based on the 
Heckman and McCurdy (1980) home production model, and similar to the model of crime 
participation in Iyengar (2009).   
  Suppose an individual maximizes a simple utility function u(C) with a simple budget 
constraint C = y.  The individual has one unit of time he or she can allocate to the legal 
sector, L, or insurgent activity, V.   The returns from the legal sector are  the wages paid, wL.  
The returns to individual i  from insurgent activity are         where wV  is the monetary 
wage paid to participants in the insurgency and θi is the net psychological return for 
participation in the insurgency (this potentially may include both the positive [sympathy for 
the political objectives of the insurgent group] and the negative [an aversion to violence]).  
The individual psychological return θ is an element of [0, 1] and has a distribution H(θ) 
which admits a density h(θ ).  An individual will participate in insurgent activity if the returns 
to insurgent activity are higher than those of the non-violent sector.  The marginal participant 
is the individual whose θ equates the returns in the two sectors, that is define             .  
The fraction of the population participating is: 
Pr                     )      (1) 




2.2 Insurgent Production of Violence 
.  Their objective is to produce the most attacks, T.  Attacks require some amount of capital 
and labor such that         ,    .  The production function f is increasing in labor and capital 
and there is some imperfect substitutability between capital and labor.  These imply that: 
  
      0  ,   
      0 , and    
        0 .  The labor supply available to groups is  
         and the budget constraint is            where M  is the group’s initial 
endowment of resources.  Suppose that the insurgent group j chooses to produce some   9
fraction of hard attacks, denoted γj, and the rest soft attacks.
9  The equilibrium number of 
attacks will therefore be     ,         ,  where        and     
     
  .   
Suppose γ is a choice parameter which measures preference for soft attacks, relative 
to hard attacks.  Suppose that insurgent groups set   
           , that is they set the fraction 
of soft attacks equal to the preference of the k
th quantile member. The basis for this 
assumption is that insurgent groups in Iraq operated in a competitive environment in which 
they compete similar to political parties.
10 In such a framework, we can then consider the 
relationship between the choice parameter for soft attacks, γ, and the psychological costs of 
participation, θ. If these preferences are uncorrelated, that is      ,    0 , then we would 
expect the change in attacks with respect to changes in the legal sector wage to be negative, 
i.e. 
  
   
 
  
   
    
  
   
 0  but the equilibrium proportion of hard attacks to remain fixed, that 
is 
   /  
   
 0 .  If however,      ,    0 , that is the psychological cost of participation is 
positively correlated with preference for soft attacks, then we would expect the fraction of 
hard attacks to be increasing in the legal sector wage. The intuition behind this is that as the 
wage in the legal sector increases, individuals with high overall negative psychological costs 
exit from the insurgency to the non-violent sector.  If these are also the individuals who 
preferred soft attacks, then the proportion of hard attacks increases. This may arise if more 
radical individuals (i.e. those with a lower psychological cost) prefer attacking military 
targets or fear detection and capture less.
11   
To illustrate the competing issues, suppose that             |     in which case the 
proportion of hard attacks is set by the median taste for violence by the members of the 
insurgent group.  If this is the case, then under appropriate regularity conditions for the 
distribution H, we will observe attacks decrease, 
  
   
 0 , capital intensivity increases 
   







   
 0 , and there is an ambiguous overall effect on the absolute number of 
                                                 
9 For example, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has become well-known for its large car bomb and suicide vest attacks 
against civilian populations.   AQI also conducts attacks against U.S. and Iraqi security forces, but has devoted 
much effort to and achieved notoriety for its brutal attacks against civilians.  By contrast, rejectionist groups 
such as the New Ba’ath Party and Jaysh Rajal al-Tariqah al-Naqshbandia (JRTN) minimize their targeting of 
civilian populations in favor of attacks on security forces in their attempt to precipitate a withdrawal of U.S. and 
allied forces from Iraq. 
10 For details see Iyengar and Monten (2008) and Blattman and Miguel (2010) 
11 This logic may be less likely to hold for terrorist groups, who have different goals and therefore a different 
relationship to the civilian population, than for insurgent groups. Some evidence from the Iraq conflict suggests 
this might be the case. AQI – one of the most violent extremist group operating in Iraq - focused almost entirely 
on attacks against civilian targets as part of their “Harvest of Prosperity” campaign in 2009, during a period 
when violence levels were broadly declining and only the most fanatical groups remained.    10
hard attacks. This ambiguous effect arises because the change in wages in the non-violent 
sector has two effects: substitution and composition.   
  
   
   1        
  
   




   
     ( 2 )  
The first term corresponds to the substitution effect and the second term corresponds 
to the composition effect.  Since the costs of labor are higher, there are fewer attacks 
produced.  However, those left in the insurgent group prefer hard attacks.  Thus the net effect 
of an increase in wages on the total number of hard attacks cannot be theoretically predicted 
and depends on the relative magnitude of the substitution and composition effects that are 
empirically determined.  
 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION AND ESTIMATION DESIGN 
3.1 Data 
To assess the impact of reconstruction spending in Iraq, we use several different data 
sets, linked at the district-month level. To measure violent civilian fatalities, we use data 
compiled by the Iraq Body Count (IBC) organization.
12 The IBC records violent civilian 
deaths independently confirmed by at least two major new organizations.
13 For each incident 
the data records the location, the perpetrator (Coalition Forces or insurgents), a description of 
the method of attack, and the target of the attack (civilians, political leaders, police, or Iraqi 
police and military forces). For the purposes of addressing our specific questions, we made a 
series of additional coding changes to the IBC data. First, we dropped all incidents in which 
U.S. or coalition forces were responsible for the harm to non-combatants, such collateral 
damage during aerial bombings, accidental shootings, or escalation of force incidents at 
checkpoints.  Second, we excluded observations based on large numbers of unidentified 
bodies reported by morgues in large cities such as Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Mosul.  These 
bodies could not be linked to any specific attacks or causes, but represented incidents with the 
highest reported deaths in the dataset.
14 After these exclusions, based on the description given 
                                                 
12 The principal researchers are Hamit Dardagan and John Sloboda. 
13 For a complete description of the IBC’s methodology, see http://www.iraqbodycount.org/about/methods/. 
Once there are two news sources reporting an incident, the IBC constructs two measures, reportedminimum and 
reportedmaximum.  If multiple numbers are reported, the lowest is entered as reportedminimum. This can be 
zero if “zero deaths” is reported. However, wording like “unable to confirm any violent civilian deaths” is not a 
report of zero deaths and thus is not entered in either column. Moreover, when the report does not mention 
civilians specifically, this number is entered in the reportedmaximum variable but zero is entered into the 
reportedminimum variable unless the proportion of violent civilian deaths is given or a similar detail is given.) If 
a “family” is reported killed, this is entered as three deaths. 
14 The origins of these deaths are often unclear, but media accounts suggest they are frequently the result of 
interethnic violence and particularly Shia militia responses to Sunni groups.   11
for each incident, we coded both the province and district where the incident took place.
15 We 
also re-coded the method of attack employed by insurgent groups using a more consistent set 
of categories: small arms fire, indirect fire, torture and executions, and explosive bombings.  
Within the bombing category, we further coded each incident according to several sub-
categories
16 reports on the fraction of incidents attributed to each attack type over the period 
for which data is available. 
An important issue for our analysis is  the development of a theory of which of the 
attack methods that appear in the IBC data are likely to be more labor-intensive than others.  
In particular, we are interested in the degree to which a method of attack requires individuals 
who participate in both the insurgency and the legal labor market.  As the model developed in 
section 2 suggests, individuals who only participate in either the insurgency or in the non-
violent labor market should not be affected by changes in labor market conditions. By 
determining which positions in insurgent attack cells are likely to be occupied by people who 
participate in both the insurgency and the legal labor market, we  developed predictions about 
which attack methods should be sensitive or insensitive to variation in the legal labor market. 
We base our analysis of the labor-intensiveness of various types of insurgent violence 
on the skills required to perpetrate a particular attack. Bombings in Iraq are virtually all either 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or roadside landmines.  Due to the deployment of 
advanced Coalition force countermeasures against IEDs, as well as the danger of accidental 
detonation while assembling a device, bombmakers are assumed to be skilled personnel who 
have a high opportunity cost of participating in the non-violent labor market.
17  These people 
are virtually never used in actually placing the devices due to the opportunity cost.  Instead, 
use of IEDs represents a labor-intensive form of attack because of the emplacers required, 
who are  mostly not specialists who assemble the bombs, and are believed to be paid on a per 
attack basis.
18  Many of the same skills required to emplace an IED are the same as those 
required for a small arms attack, so we similarly consider these to be labor-intensive attacks.  
We also include rocket-propelled grenade attacks in the small arms fire category.  However, 
methods of “indirect fire,” which include artillery and mortar shells, are considered capital-
intensive.  Some training and expertise is required in order to hit a target with a rocket or 
mortar, and the actual act does not require a large number of personnel – one well-trained 
                                                 
15 A district-level map of Iraq is available from the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq at 
http://www.uniraq.org/library/maps_geographic.asp. 
16 These include suicide bombings, roadside bombings (including improvised explosive devices or IEDs), 
vehicular bombings, and other. 
17 On U.S. military countermeasures deployed against IEDs, see Hanson (2008). 
18 See Grant (2006).   12
individual can conduct an effective indirect fire attack.  The main constraint is in the 
munitions available, since these must be good-quality military-grade munitions (ideally that 
have not been in storage for a long time).  These types of attacks are therefore likely to be 
relatively insensitive to variation in the non-violent labor market. The final category of attack 
type, torture and executions, requires groups and can be done by virtually anyone with 
weapons; these forms of attack should respond to variation in the legal labor market. 
The distribution of these attacks is shown in Table 1.  In Panel A, these attack 
categories include bombings that labor intensive (landmines, roadside, and suicide bombing) 
and capital intensive (car bombs and multiple explosive devices).  The other labor intensive 
categories are small arms fire (accounting for nearly half of total attacks) and torture and 
execution (accounting for only 5 percent in the early part of the insurgency but growing to 
nearly 20 percent of all attacks in the later part).  The capital intensive category of indirect 
fire is smaller than either small arms or bombings and account for only 6-8 percent of total 
attacks, but are more substantial in generating fatalities.  Panel B shows fatalities that are 
uncategorized by type but appear in the IBC data as either hospital or morgue deaths—a 
higher fraction in early periods but reduced over time as IBC reporting improves.  The 
recoding of these hospital/morgue deaths poses somewhat of a problem since we are 
uncertain as to the number of incidents generating these deaths but as a fraction of reported 
incidents these account for a small part of the sample (they account for a much larger fraction 
of the total fatalities).  Coalition generated and Iraqi Security forces generated attacks are 
excluded because of the complicated issues regarding classifying the attack type and because 
it is unclear what the predicted effect of reduced insurgent activity on these types of attacks 
should be.   
The IBC data has several advantages. There has been substantial controversy over 
attempts to measure excess violent civilian deaths in Iraq since the 2003 invasion. Most 
disagreement, for example over a 2006 study reported in the medical journal The Lancet 
which placed this figure around 601,000, concerns attempts to estimate this number through 
samples of household surveys administered directly in Iraq.
19 The IBC avoids these sampling 
and estimation problems by compiling a direct count of violent civilian deaths. It is also 
important to note that although the organization is partisan in its anti-war views, their 
methodology is transparent and conservative in seeking to provide an accurate lower bound 
                                                 
19 Burnham et al (2006). For a discussion of the quality of the estimates produced by these household surveys, 
see Kahl (2007).   13
for the number of violent civilian deaths reported.
20 Finally, unlike even U.S. government 
data, the group has used a consistent methodology since the beginning of the conflict. 
However, the IBC data also has several weaknesses that may reduce confidence in any 
findings. There is often ambiguity in the description given for some incidents regarding the 
target or method of attack. This is particularly true for observations based on new reports of 
bodies found with gunshot wounds or signs of torture, but where the circumstances of the 
deaths are unclear.
21 
  Thus, in addition to the IBC data, we use attack data based on “significant activity” 
(SIGACT) reports filed by Coalition forces in Iraq. These reports record any incident or event 
in which military personnel came into contact with hostile forces. Unclassified data drawn 
from the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) SIGACTS III Database were provided by 
Berman, Felter and Shapiro (2009) from the Empirical Studies of Conflict project. These data 
provide a count of the number of incidents in a district month-year.  They also provide 
aggregate counts of the number of attacks at night and during the day.  The data span 
incidents from February 2004 and July 2008. The unclassified data do not include any 
information pertaining to the Coalition Force units involved, Coalition Force casualties, or 
battle damage incurred as a result of the reported incidents. Moreover, the data do not include 
successful coalition-initiated events, such as raids where no one returned fire, or coalition-
initiated indirect fire attacks not triggered by an initiating insurgent attack.  These attacks do 
not necessarily involve a fatality. The number of casualties resulting from each reported 
incident is not available. 
  Summary statistics for both the civilian and military measures of violence are 
provided in Table 1.  The average number of attacks with civilian fatalities is only about 0.4 
per 100,000 people, while attacks on coalition forces are substantially higher at 26 per 
100,000 people.  Much of the violence is from small-arms fire but a sizeable minority are due 
to explosive devices.  There are significantly more attacks on Coalition forces at night time.  
Most of the violence is concentrated in only a few provinces: Anbar, Basrah, Babil, Baghdad, 
Diyala, Najaf, and Salah-Din.  Much of the Kurdish region in the north and unpopulated areas 
in the west and south of the country experienced minimal insurgent related violence. 
                                                 
20 The data can be downloaded from http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/. 
21 On the ability of insurgent groups to conceal killings from Iraqi authorities, see for example Dehghanpisheh 
(2007).    14
  To measure reconstruction spending, we use data provided by the U.S. military from 
the Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP) fund.
22 According to the law 
authorizing the funds, CERP money can be spent on one of 18 project areas.
23 The project 
categories span a wide range of infrastructure and social service areas including agriculture, 
education, health care, transportation, and sanitation. For each project recorded in the dataset, 
these data report the location (including the province and district), total amount spent, and 
duration. These data also provide detailed information on project type. We coded each project 
initiated with CERP funds into four broad categories: construction, refurbishment, 
procurement, security, and condolence/compliance payoffs. Based on this division, we 
constructed a count of “labor intensive” projects, or projects that generate local employment 
and draw on CERP money to pay wages to individuals over the duration of the project. These 
include construction and refurbishment, and exclude procurement, security, and compliance 
payments. Specific project sectors such as repairing and reconstruction schools and hospitals 
or civic cleanup were coded as employing labor, while other funding categories such as 
condolence payments, detainee release payments, and rule of law/governance programs were 
coded as not labor intensive.
24 Figure 1 shows the relationship between the start of new 
projects and funding levels. In general, total funds spent in each fiscal year are highly 
correlated with both the number of new projects.   
  These projects initiated some of the only legal employment available in Iraq during 
this period of time.  According to the World Food Survey, during the 2004-2007 period Iraqi 
Government and Coalition Force initiated-reconstruction programs represented the only 
substantive employment opportunities.  During this period, unemployment estimates range 
from 25-40% percent for the entire period of the conflict.  The employment-population ratio 
ranged from 30-37 percent (as compared to the UK at 59% and US at 62% during the same 
period).  Because of this, military and contractors were encouraged, though not required, to 
hire local labor.
25 
                                                 
22 We thank Jacob Shapiro and the Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) project at Princeton University and the 
United States Military Academy for providing similar data used for an earlier version of this paper. 
23 For a full list of authorized CERP project areas, see Appendix D of Office of the Special Inspector General for 
Iraq Reconstruction (2007). On the purposes of the CERP program and guidelines for the use of CERP funds, 
see Tackaberry (2004); Martins (2005); and U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (2009). 
24 Several U.S. agencies have conducted independent audits of CERP program spending; see Office of the 
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (2007); Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction (2005); and U.S. Government Accountability Office (2007). 
25 Based on estimates from the World Food Program, Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis: 
Iraq 2004-2007.   15
CERP program funds were reauthorized by the U.S. Congress in five separate bills, 
but at different total amounts for each reauthorization. We therefore identified the five dates 
when the amount of total funds allocated to the Iraq CERP program legislated by Congress 
changed, corresponding to each fiscal year between 2004 and 2009, with an additional 
supplemental funding bill in FY 2006.
26 In January 2004, funding levels for the CERP 
program were relatively low.  In the 2005 fiscal year, funding was more than five-fold from 
$140 million to $718 million.  The support was short lived and in 2006 funding was cut back 
to around $500 million.  A supplemental spending bill increasing funds subsequently raised 
the total available funds by $200 million.   That level of funding (approximately $700 million 
per year) was maintained in the 2007 budget.       
Information on division-level unit rotations in Iraq for the period May 2003 to June 
2008 was compiled primarily from press releases issued by the Department of Defense 
(DOD), Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), and Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) 
announcing a transfer of command, and supplemented with additional secondary sources.
27 
Following the end of the major combat phase of the Iraq war, the U.S. military divided the 
Iraqi theater into several division-sized areas of operation (AORs), each with an independent 
divisional command, under a central military command in Baghdad (first the Combined Joint 
Task Force 7, and later called Multinational Force-Iraq).
28 The data establishes the incoming 
and outgoing divisional commands and the date of the transfer. For some divisions in some 
periods, command authority was transferred to a “Task Force” comprised of command 
elements from several different units, but usually dominated by one brigade-level command. 




3.2 Identification Strategy 
A key issue in estimating the impact of CERP on violence is that the amount of new 
projects initiated in a district in a month is most likely related to prior trends in violence. 
                                                 
26 Dates and amounts from Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (2008). 
27 These include McGrath (2006) and Morgan (2009). 
28 These are: MND-Baghdad, MND-Northwest; MND-North Central; MNF-West; MND-Central-South; and 
MND Southeast. After September 2005, MND-NW and MND-NC were consolidated into MND-North. MND-
Central was created around the “belt areas” surrounding Baghdad in conjunction with the surge in April 2007. 
After August 2009, the military command in Iraq was reorganized into four divisions under Multinational 
Corps-Iraq: Multinational Division-North, Multinational Division-Baghdad, Multinational Division-South, and 
Multinational Force-West. 
29 With exceptions, these areas generally experienced lower rates of violence, and in any case represent a small 
area of the country because the U.S. contributed the overwhelming majority of the manpower for military forces 
in Iraq.   16
Commanders may be reluctant to start reconstruction activities when violent conditions 
threaten local Iraqi laborers and civilian aid workers, and military personnel are occupied 
with re-establishing security. Alternatively, military commanders may channel reconstruction 
funds to the least secure areas in an attempt to undermine the insurgency where it is most 
active.
30 We therefore used the rotation of U.S. military divisions assigned to an area, 
interacted with the level of total available funding, as instrument. As described, beginning in 
2003 the U.S. military divided the Iraqi theater into several division-sized areas of operation.. 
These divisional-sized forces typically deployed to an area of operation for approximately 
one year, although deployment times had occasionally been lengthened due to constraints on 
the availability of forces. Each is under an independent divisional command led by an officer 
at the rank of major general.  Within each division (also known as Major Subordinate 
Commands, or MSCs), there are several brigades (or, for Marine units, regiments), each 
commanded by a colonel. While divisions are permanently organized with "organic" units 
(e.g. the 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Cavalry Division), while deployed they are 
"task organized" such that the majority of brigades are not organic to the division 
headquarters they are deployed with.
31   
However, we considered the MSC to be the appropriate unit of analysis for several 
reasons.  The primary reason is that for CERP projects less than $500,000, the MSC 
commander is the approval authority (projects above $500,000 require the approval of the 
Multinational Corps-Iraq commander).
32  Although this authority can be -- and for smaller 
projects was -- delegated to brigade commanders, the MSCs provided key guidance and 
oversight.  Projects may be nominated by commanders down at the company level (captains).  
However, proposals must not only meet the conditions set by the legal constraints of the 
CERP program but also fit in to the campaign plans of higher commanders.
33 For this reason, 
the guidance established at the MSC level had a direct effect on all levels of CERP spending -
- and critically for this analysis, the MSC campaign plans influence both the amount of 
overall spending and the balance between the amount of spending devoted to labor-
employing projects and to other, non-labor-employing purposes such as procurement or 
                                                 
30 See, for example, Wilder (2009). 
31 For example, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored Division deployed to Multinational Division-
Baghdad under the command of first the 4th Infantry Division headquarters and later the 1st Cavalry Division 
headquarters during its 2008-2009 deployment, while the 1st Armored Division headquarters was assigned to 
Multinational Division-North. For a complete listing of the task organization of Coalition forces in Iraq over 
time, see data compiled by Morgan (2009). 
32 GAO (2008).     
33 The campaign plan is a classified document outlining the initial and desired end states and linking them 
through planned operations.  See, for example, Joint Publication 5-0 (2006)..   17
condolence payments.  Although this guidance varied over time due to friendly, enemy, and 
civilian considerations, we utilized variation common to MSCs as cross-sectional units.  This 
variation parameter can be interpreted as the overall disposition of each division's 
commander and staff to labor-intensive and capital-intensive CERP projects.  
A related issue  for the estimation of the causal effect of spending programs on 
violence is whether certain types of military units are assigned to an area of responsibility 
(AOR) based on current or anticipated violence levels. The exclusion restriction for an 
instrument requires that the assignment of military units to an area is uncorrelated with other 
determinants of violence. In general, it appears that at the division level this is the case.  The 
most common method by which units (at any level) are assigned to areas based on current or 
anticipated violence levels is by shifting the geographic boundaries of the units’ AORs.
34  
AORs at the division level may change slightly during a division’s deployment, but these 
changes are much smaller relative to the size of the unit at the division level rather than at the 
brigade level or below and therefore are not a major concern.  
 The second issue regarding our exclusion restriction comes from the possibility that 
particular division headquarters are moved from one area to another based on current or 
anticipated violence levels.  However, division headquarters movements are planned years in 
advance with the CENTCOM Force Requirements Enhanced Database (FRED) and it is 
virtually impossible to change the planned movement of a division headquarters with even a 
few months’ notice.
35  
A final concern is that a military unit’s preference for specific types of projects is 
correlated with a set of counterinsurgency tactics and practices other than reconstruction 
activities, and which also affect violence.  We address this in our fixed-effects approach, in 
which these differences are fixed over time.  Identification therefore comes from the change 
in project spending over time, for a given division.  This difference may arise because of 
changes in the level of funding allocated to the division over time – a result of a nation-level 
appropriations action.  With greater funding, divisional units with labor specific preferences 
may increase the fraction of labor intensive projects in the areas in which they control.  In 
contrast, divisional units with non-labor specific preferences may reduce (or not change) the 
                                                 
34 It is logistically difficult to deploy or send home units in response to changes on the ground.  Geographic 
boundaries for units already in the theater can be changed more easily.  A notable exception is the 2007 “surge,” 
which still took months to implement. 
35 Appendix Figure 1 shows the autocorrelation in attacks is about 5 months long—not long enough to allow 
sufficient predictability of violence to assign units based on skills or preferences.   18
fraction of labor intensive projects in their areas of control, despite an increase in the amount 
of funds available.   
Using changes in the total level of available funds, as well as the rotation patterns of 
military divisions, we can estimate a first stage of the fraction of labor intensive projects on 
units. The causal chain can be described as follows. 
 
To estimate the effect of reconstruction spending on violence using this strategy, we construct 
an interaction instrument interacting the military division, which we assigned to a given 
AOR, and the funding period: 
                                                                              3 
       
In the first stage equation (3), the dependent variable labor refers to a measure of labor-
intensive reconstruction, more precisely: a count of labor-intensive projects which includes 
construction, refurbishment, employment, and public works projects.  The instrument unit is 
an indicator variable that is for unit u in j which is interacted with funding period t.   The 
fixed effects then include a district specific effect (δj), a time specific effect (τt) and a unit 
specific effect (μu).   In addition, we include a nationwide quadratic time-trend and controls 
for the total number of CERP projects or CERP spending in a district-time period.  Using the 
predicted fraction of labor intensive projects funded by the division, we can then estimate the 
second stage regression akin to equation (4) but using fixed effects rather than the explicit 
covariate controls.  
ln      γ       labor                              γ  
D  γ  
T  γ  
U  u    (4) 
In equation (4), γ
D, γ
T, γ
U represent fixed effects for district, month, and unit respectively.   
The estimates of γ1 and λ1 provide estimates for the aggregate effect of changes in labor 
demand in the licit sector on production of violence (measured either as insurgent-initiated 
attacks or fatalities per attack).   
The theoretical framework used to derive these estimating equations leads to an 
additional set of predictions.  If capital is fixed in the short term and insurgent groups cannot 
instantaneously adjust by substituting more capital intensive types of violence, then 
estimating equation (4) for labor intensive forms of violence should produce a consistent 
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wages. Estimating equations (6) for capital intensive forms of violence production should 
produce no change in the number of attacks if labor and capital are not substitutes in 
production and capital is fixed. If labor and capital are substitutes in the production of 
violence, then capital-intensive attacks may increase. Similarly, if they are complements, 
capital-intensive attacks may decrease. If the effect operates though a labor supply channel, 
we should also expect substitution from day to night attacks. This would reflect less 
manpower being available to insurgents during working hours. On the other hand, if  
development and reconstruction projects increase the number of available targets for 
insurgents, we would expect to see an increase in day-time attacks. 
Based on this model and identification strategy, we identified five main predictions 
about the consequences of improvements in the non-violent labor market for insurgent 
violence:  
(1) The overall level of insurgent attacks which kill civilians (rather than attacks on 
military targets) should unambiguously decline. 
(2) Depending on the relative cost of hard vs. soft target attacks, the net effect on 
attacks on military targets is ambiguous. This is because there is also a shift in 
group taste for attacks against hard targets which shifts the optimization decisions 
of insurgent groups. 
(3) The number of labor-intensive types of attacks should unambiguously decline. 
(4) The number of capital-intensive attacks is ambiguous.  It may decline if capital 
and labor are complements. It may increase if capital and labor are substitutes and 
capital is available. It may stay the same if capital and labor are substitutes but 
capital stocks are fixed in the short term. 
(5) The number of attacks that occur during working hours should decrease relative 
to the number of attacks conducted at night if there is reduced labor available for 
attacks. The number of attacks that occur during daytime will increase if the change in 
targeting is due to increased exposure of military forces. 
 
4. RESULTS  
 
To identify the causal effect of reconstruction spending on violence through labor 
market channels, we needed to establish several facts to support our instrumental variables 
(IV) approach.  First, when available funding increases, the total number of projects 
increases. Figure 1 shows that there has been substantial variation in the total number of new   20
projects started.  This variation occurred in addition to the variation, shown in Figure 1, in the 
level of total available funds. Between the first year of the program, beginning in January 
2004, and 2009 the amount appropriated to the CERP program by Congress stayed between 
$500 and $700 million per year.  Figure 1 shows that the level of total funding available and 
the number of new projects started appear to coincide: more projects occurred when more 
funds were available. Second, we assumed that different military units preferred different 
types of projects. Expenditures on labor-intensive projects are in fact on average higher in 
certain military divisions relative to others, regardless of funding period.  Third, we assumed 
that military units that preferred labor intensive projects will do even more labor-related 
projects during higher funding periods relative to military units that prefer non-labor related 
projects (such as procurement) or prefer to not spend CERP funds. Figure 2 shows labor 
expenditures in high and low funding periods by military division, confirming this 
assumption.  
 We estimated a first stage of labor-intensive projects or labor-related expenditures on 
a fully interacted set of indicator variables for units and funding periods (equation 3). Table 2 
reports the results of first stage estimation.  The identifying assumption for this specification 
is that military units that prefer labor-intensive projects increase the number of projects that 
are labor-intensive when additional CERP funds are available, but hold fixed all other unit 
specific activities.  We find that indeed there is substantial variation in the levels of labor-
intensive reconstruction activity by district and that this varies in predictable ways across 
funding period.  Taking FY2005-2006 as the base period (period 3), there are significantly 
fewer projects in funding period 1(2003-2004) and significantly more projects in periods 2 
(2004-2005), 4 (2006-mid-2007), 5 (mid-2007-2008), and 6 (2008-2009).  Period 4 
experienced the largest increase in projects. Periods 5 and 6 had higher project levels than 
period 3, but slightly lower levels than period 4.  The excluded instrument F-Statistic is 20.91 
 
A. Attack Levels 
Table 3 presents the results from both the OLS and IV regressions. Columns (1)-(4) 
estimate the effect of CERP spending on civilian attacks, civilian fatalities, and military 
incidents.  The OLS estimates in Columns (1) and (3), covering all districts and weeks in the 
data, indicate that higher violence areas may have slightly higher levels of labor intensive 
projects, masking the potential security gains to implementing these projects. The IV estimate 
in Column (2), which more plausibly isolates the causal effect of CERP projects on violence,   21
indicates that each new labor-intensive project reduces attacks on civilians by 2 percentage 
points, the equivalent of a 49% decrease in incidents. Attacks on Coalition forces appear to 
increase significantly as labor-intensive projects increase. Each new labor-intensive project is 
associated with a 13% increase in military incidents in the IV model.  The much smaller 
increase in attacks on coalition forces should be interpreted as the net effect of decreased 
attacks from the increased cost of labor and the increase in hard attacks versus soft target 
attacks.
36 
This combination of results – a reduction in insurgent violence targeted at civilians, 
but an increase in insurgent incidents involving military forces - could occur for several 
reasons. First, project oversight itself may increase the exposure of Coalition forces to 
insurgent activity, providing more opportunities for attacks.  Second, the increased presence 
and visibility of Coalition forces in local communities may further antagonize insurgent 
forces, increasing the desire to attack perceived occupiers.  Third, insurgent groups may no 
longer have the more marginally attached members who previously conducted untargeted 
violence, due to the CERP-generated increase in labor demand.  The shift to more committed 
members may result in the unanticipated effect of increasing violence towards Coalition 
forces.  Finally, insurgent groups may strategically substitute away from attacks that cause 
civilian fatalities and towards attacks on Coalition forces in order to counteract the “hearts 
and mind” effect of reconstruction projects.
37 
 
B. Lethality of Attacks 
Columns (5) through (8) of Table 3 present the results for total number of civilian 
fatalities and the number of fatalities per attack. There is a 56 percent reduction in civilian 
fatalities in Column (6), consistent with the decline in attacks which result in civilian 
fatalities. However, there is a marginally significant increase in civilians killer per attack.  
This is consistent the increase in extremism predicted by the model, where lethality increases 
with CERP spending because those insurgents who have the highest comparative advantage 
in orchestrating highly lethal attacks are the least likely to leave the group to work in CERP 
projects.  These insurgents will tend to be the more committed and potentially better trained, 
as opposed to those active in the group primarily for the lack of better options. This shift in 
                                                 
36 A concern with both these OLS and IV estimates is that the second stage dependent variable - the level of 
civilian attacks - may not be time stationary. Hence, we also report coefficients using a quadratic time trend in 
Table 3. These results are also consistent when we use first differences to estimate the effect of changes in net 
projects on changes in civilian attacks on a week-to-week basis. First difference results available in the 
appendix. 
37 For additional discussion of this “hearts and minds” effect, see Berman, Felter, and Shapiro (2008).   22
insurgent personnel thus results in a more complicated substitution of attack types where we 
observe fewer attacks against civilians but more fatalities.  The increase in fatalities per 
attack is not consistent with insurgent groups strategically substituting away from civilian 
targeted attacks as the attacks they do produce appear to be more likely to kill civilians. This 
is consistent with capital intensive attacks producing higher levels of fatalities per attack.  
 
C. Composition of Attack Types 
If insurgent organizations were affected by a CERP-induced decrease in the supply of 
recruits, we might expect changes in the types of attacks they can successfully mobilize. 
Specifically, we might expect a decrease in labor-intensive types of attacks relative to other 
non-labor intensive attack types. Figure 3 shows that composition of attack types over time.  
While small-arms fire (such as gunfire and drive-by shootings) are the primary sources of 
violence, there is a substantial amount of explosive bombing-related attacks and a growing 
level of torture and execution over time. Critically, small arms fire and vehicle bombing tend 
to be very labor intensive as they require at least one individual per attack initiated.  Other 
forms of attack, such as roadside bombing and indirect fire require more skilled and fewer 
marginally attached laborers.  
 In Table 4, we divided violent attacks into two broad categories: explosive attacks 
(Panel A) and non-explosive attacks (Panel B). Explosive attacks include vehicular 
bombings, roadside bombings (often improvised explosive devices or IEDs), suicide 
bombings, and other. Non-explosive attacks include small arms fire, indirect fire, and torture 
and executions.  During CERP projects, it appears that the number of vehicular bombs 
decrease by about 40 percent while other explosives increase by about 30 percent. For the 
non-explosive categories, small arms attacks, especially drive-by shootings, decrease by 
9.5%, but there is a significant increase in indirect fire incidents, by about 38 percent. This 
pattern of results is consistent with the reduced use of low-skilled labor intensive attacks. 
Suicide attacks and torture and execution, presumably committed by the most attached 
individuals, are unaffected by labor-intensive CERP spending. 
 
D. Day-Night Substitution 
  Another testable prediction of the labor market mechanism is that if the reduction of 
violence is due to higher cost of labor, we would expect to observe insurgent attacks to 
decline during working hours. If fewer recruits are available during time spent working for 
CERP-funded wages, insurgent groups might be compelled to conduct a greater proportion of   23
attacks at night (or during non-working hours). On the other hand, if work projects increase 
the ability of insurgents to observe collaborators or U.S. forces, attacks might increase during 
the day. Thus, the timing of attacks provides some information on the underlying mechanism 
generating the reduction in violence reported in Table 3. The results from this test are mixed. 
In Table 5, we find that there is a decrease in day time attacks on civilians, consistent with the 
model.  The decline in overall civilian attacks during CERP projects is due to a day time 
decrease, with no corresponding increase in attacks on civilians at night.
38  However, there is 
also a corresponding increase in attacks on U.S. forces during the day. We therefore can't 
separate the possibility that the remaining hard-core of insurgents in a group are more willing 
to target US forces during the day (a result consistent with the model, due to the shift in the 
preference of the median member of the group for attacks against hard targets) or because 
U.S. forces are more exposed due to their greater involvement in local communities via 
CERP projects.
39   
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This study identifies the effect of the labor market activity generated by 
reconstruction programs on violence levels in Iraq.  The opportunity cost theory suggests that 
improved labor market options in the non-violent sector for potential insurgent recruits 
increases the cost of labor to the insurgency and reduces the total labor supply available to 
engage in violent insurgent activity.  Using a model of labor supply and violence production, 
we show that this reduced labor supply can reduce the total number of attacks.   The 
predictions from this theory are validated by empirical observations in the field.   From these 
observations we find that that increasing labor-intensive reconstruction projects reduces 
insurgent violence by decreasing labor intensive types of attacks targeted at civilians and day 
time attacks. However, non-intuitively, as the theory predicts,  we also find evidence that 
labor-employing reconstruction projects may also generate several unintended consequences, 
including an increase in attacks targeted at military forces and in increase in the lethality of 
attacks due to substitution away from low-skilled, labor-intensive forms of violence. These 
                                                 
38 These results should be interpreted with caution, since its also plausible that insurgents may observe 
collaborators and project sites during the day and attack targets at night. We see this as a robustness check that 
fits with an overall pattern of results supporting the opportunity cost model, rather than conclusive evidence 
against the view that labor projects increase the risk to civilians by allowing insurgents to observe collaboration. 
39 An additional consideration is that retaliation against U.S. forces during the night may not be a viable 
alternative for insurgents, given the advantage available to U.S. forces operating at night due to thermal 
imaging, night-vision equipment, and surveillance and reconnaissance assets.  This advantage has inspired 
informal U.S. military slogans such as “We Own The Night.”   24
results are also consistent with the model’s prediction that reducing the recruiting pool 
available to insurgent groups due to better employment conditions may push insurgent groups 
in a more radicalized direction, due to a shift in the preferences of the median member.    
The causal interpretation of the estimated effects relies on the several assumptions.  
Force rotations are assumed to be independent of other determinants of violence, including 
predicted future violence. Military units which prefer labor-intensive projects may differ from 
other units in other respects, but we assume that these differences are fixed over time, and that 
labor-preferring military units will increase the fraction of projects that are labor-intensive 
when increased funds are available. Together these assumptions allow us to instrument for 
project spending using the interaction between military unit, location, and time period.  If any 
one of these assumptions is violated, our instrument will fail the exclusion restriction and the 
causal relationship can be questioned.  Our analysis is also limited by the quality of the 
available data. While both the IBC and the CERP data have been used in the past, there are 
likely to be omissions and miscoding which may generate bias.  While we were unable to 
identify systematic bias in the reporting of CERP project data, since the data is collected in a 
conflict zone there may be some deficiencies.  Issues of classical measurement error bias 
aside, if project data is missing or misreported in correlation with violence, this would 
produce bias.  We also have little information on the quality or management of projects.  If 
differences in project management quality are associated with project type, violence levels, or 
the timing of rotations, it will bias the estimates. We have found no evidence for such 
relationships. These limitations notwithstanding, the empirical results are consistent with the 
predictions from the theory, suggesting that underlying relationship between strengthening 
the labor market in the non-violent sector and a decrease in insurgent-initiated violence is 
likely to be robust. 
 Our findings represent an important step in connecting research on legal sectors and 
crime to insurgency research. A large research literature has explored the relationship 
between unemployment and crime. This study contributes an explicit application of this type 
of research to civil conflict and counterinsurgency policy by integrating theoretical modeling 
and an analysis of empirical conflict data. Given the difficulty in implementing many 
reconstruction projects and the  concerns about corruption and mismanagement, it is useful to 
know that the simple labor market effect can produce substantial short-term reductions in 
violence. Critically, this benefit occurs even if these projects do not result in an improvement 
in the provision of public goods, the key mechanism underlying previous research on this   25
question.  Given this, the returns to labor-intensive public goods provision are likely to be 
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Figure 1. Relationship between Congressional Appropriations and CERP Project Starts  
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Figure 2. Military Division Labor-Intensive Project Starts  
Notes: Labor intensive projects include construction projects, refurbishment projects, employment projects, and public works.     30 
 
Figure 3. Composition of Violence over Time by Type of Attack 
Notes. Civilian attacks are defined as any attack resulting in at least one civilian casualty.  Data on civilian attacks based on the Iraqi Body Counts.  Military Incidents are defined as any 
significant action against Coalition Forces.  Data on military incidents based on SIGACTS database provided by the Princeton Empirical Study of Conflict Project (Berman, Felter, Shapiro, 
2008).  Dependent variables are scaled to be per 10,000 inhabitants with population estimates based on World Food Program Household Survey (2007).     31






















Total CERP Projects  5.2854  0.79  5.32  7.94  6.51  6.88  2.16 
  (14.7398)  (6.04)  (15.74)  (14.82)  (15.34)  (21.18)  (6.50) 
              
Labor‐Intensive Projects  3.87  0.66  4.38  5.86  4.68  4.80  1.28 
  (11.59)  (4.98)  (14.02)  (11.28)  (11.4)  (16.01)  (4.23) 
              
Total CERP Expenditures  0.3641  0.13  0.35  0.42  0.47  0.60  0.18 
(in $100,000)  (1.6462)  (1.16)  (1.54)  (2.00)  (1.82)  (1.93)  (0.73) 
              
Labor‐Related Project 
Expenditures  0.23  0.10  0.24  0.27  0.30  0.37  0.12 
(in $100,00)  (0.96)  (0.91)  (0.76)  (1.03)  (1.24)  (1.2)  (0.54) 
Notes: Standard deviations reported in parentheses.  Labor intensive projects include construction projects, refurbishment projects, 
employment projects, and public works. Labor-related expenditures include wagebills, subcontractor fees, and any subcontractor 
 or agency markups.    32 
















1st Infantry   7.088 ‐ 0.308  0.201  0.965**  0.515  0.514 
  (0.218)  (1.05)  (0.362)  (0.478)  (0.419)  (0.465) 
2nd Infantry   3.330 ‐ 0.884  0.561  0.744**  0.78  0.904 
  (0.107)  (0.904)  (0.391)  (0.363)  (1.16)  (1.296) 
3rd Infantry   5.875 ‐ 0.44 0.377 0.472 2.635** 2.133***
  (0.176)  (1.09)  (0.528)  (0.69)  (1.139)  (0.849) 
4th Infantry   8.364 ‐ 0.216  0.305  0.437  2.14**  2.314*** 
  (0.211)  (1.116)  (0.584)  (0.748)  (1.137)  (0.883) 
25th Infantry   5.047 ‐ 0.427 0.132 0.724** 0.414 0.385
  (0.102)  (1.083)  (0.326)  (0.362)  (0.909)  (0.749) 
42nd Infantry   7.088 ‐ 0.823  0.308  0.509  0.822  1.223 
  (0.241)  (0.462)  (1.05)  (0.954)  (0.818)  (0.913) 
82nd Airborne   4.763 ‐ 0.944  3.391**  4.409**  1.171  1.207 
  (0.173)  (0.713) (1.532) (1.357) (0.946) (1.025)
101st Airborne   4.806 ‐ 0.451  0.12  0.685  0.392  0.359 
  (0.102)  (1.097)  (0.332)  (0.568)  (0.914)  (0.752) 
1st Cavalry   18.812 ‐ 6.285  2.031**  2.318  3.235**  2.612** 
  (0.700)  (1.796)  (0.556)  (1.334)  (1.195)  (1.333) 
1st Armored   6.774 ‐ 0.099 0.671 0.664 1.778* 2.102**
  (0.176)  (1.126)  (0.541)  (0.702)  (1.072)  (0.867) 
11th Armored   3.330 ‐ 0.884  0.761  2.744**  0.78  0.904 
Cavalry  (0.092)  (0.904)  (1.391)  (1.263)  (1.16)  (1.296) 
10th Mountain   3.659 ‐ 0.632  0.566  0.453  1.765**  0.687 
  (0.299)  (0.519) (1.042) (0.941) (0.807) (0.911)
MEF I  4.488 ‐ 0.977  3.06**  3.386***  1.459*  1.217* 
  (0.068)  (0.648)  (1.046)  (1.215)  (0.898)  (0.685) 
MEF II  4.763 ‐ 0.944  4.391*  4.409***  1.571*  1.207 
   (0.088)  (0.713) (2.532) (1.357) (0.926) (1.025)  33 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the area of responsibility (AOR) level reported in parentheses.  Estimates that are significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are denoted with a ** (*, ***).  
Dependent variables is labor intensive projects which include construction projects, refurbishment projects, employment projects, and public works.  All estimates are from a single regression. 
Also included but not reported are controls for total number of CERP projects, quadratic time trends, and district and month-year fixed effects. The excluded instrument F-Statistic = 20.91 
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Table 3. Estimates of the Effect of Reconstruction Spending on Attacks, Fatalities, and Attack Lethality 




Military Incident Levels 
Per 100,000
Civilian Fatalities Per 
100,000
Number of Civilians killed per 
Attack
Mean  0.669 9.72 2.89 4.48
Number of Labor-Intensive Projects  -0.095** -0.28*** 0.18 1.08*** -0.69*** -1.40*** -0.028 0.22*
  (0.043) (0.068) (0.23) (0.28) (0.24) (0.46) (0.11) (0.12)
Total Number of CERP Projects  0.11*** 0.25*** -0.26 -0.95*** 0.66*** 1.21*** -0.038 -0.23**
  (0.034) (0.056) (0.20) (0.23) (0.19) (0.35) (0.10) (0.11)
t  0.15*** 0.14*** 3.14*** 3.21*** 1.27*** 1.21*** -0.23 -0.20
  (0.051) (0.049) (0.66) (0.65) (0.36) (0.35) (0.31) (0.30)
t
2  -0.0017* -0.0017** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 0.0048 0.0048
  (0.00088) (0.00086) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0066) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0062)
 Method of Estimation  OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Areas of Responsibility  6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Observations  3151 3151 3151 3151 3151 3151 3151 3151
R-Squared  0.635 0.605 0.573 0.569 0.613 0.604 0.033 0.031
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the area of responsibility (AOR) level reported in parentheses.  Estimates that are significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are denoted with 
a ** (*, ***).  Civilian attacks are defined as any attack resulting in at least one civilian casualty.  Data on civilian attacks based on the Iraqi Body Counts.  Military Incidents are defined as 
any significant action against Coalition Forces.  Data on military incidents based on SIGACTS database provided by the Princeton Empirical Study of Conflict Project (Berman, Felter, 
Shapiro, 2008).  Dependent variables are scaled to be per 10,000 inhabitants with population estimates based on World Food Program Household Survey (2007). Labor intensive projects 
include construction projects, refurbishment projects, employment projects, and public works. All specifications include district and month-year fixed effects. In IV specification, the excluded 
instrument F-Statistic = 20.91    35 
Table 4. Estimates of the Effect of Reconstruction Spending on Weapon of Attacks which Result in Civilian Fatalities 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Explosive Attacks                  
  Vehicle Bombings Roadside Bombings Suicide Bombs Other Bombs
  0.045 0.082 0.043 0.022
Number of Labor-Intensive Projects  -0.010** -0.018* -0.0058 -0.0015 0.0028 0.0016 -0.0042** 0.0069**
  (0.0051) (0.0093) (0.0045) (0.0075) (0.0046) (0.0068) (0.0017) (0.0033)
Total Number of CERP Projects  0.0087** 0.015** 0.0054 0.0020 -0.0014 -0.00054 0.0030** 0.0051**
  (0.0038) (0.0070) (0.0035) (0.0058) (0.0034) (0.0051) (0.0013) (0.0025)
Panel B: Non-Explosive Attacks  Small Arms Fire Indirect Fire Torture and Execution
   0.337 0.050 0.109  
Number of Labor-Intensive Projects  -0.022* -0.032* 0.0087* 0.019** 0.0024 0.016   
  (0.012) (0.018) (0.0046) (0.0091) (0.0082) (0.014)   
Total Number of CERP Projects  0.022** 0.030** 0.0074** 0.015** 0.00067 -0.0096   
  (0.0092) (0.015) (0.0036) (0.0073) (0.0062) (0.010)   
 Method of Estimation  OLS IV OLS IV OLS  IV OLS IV
Areas of Responsibility  6 6 6 6 6  6 6 6
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the area of responsibility (AOR) level reported in parentheses.  Estimates that are significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are denoted with a ** (*, ***).  
Data on civilian attacks based on the Iraqi Body Counts.  Dependent variables are scaled to be per 10,000 inhabitants with population estimates based on World Food Program Household 
Survey (2007). Labor intensive projects include construction projects, refurbishment projects, employment projects, and public works.  All specifications include district and month-year fixed 
effects as well as a quadratic trend variable.  The excluded instrument F-Statistic = 20.91 
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Table 5. Estimates of the Effect of Reconstruction Spending on Time of Day of Attack 
   (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Panel A. Attacks with Civilian   Attacks Levels Day time Attacks Night Time Attacks
Fatalities  0.669 0.108 0.0144
Number of Labor-Intensive   -0.033**  -0.092*** -0.029** -0.085***  -0.0039*** -0.0065**
Projects  (0.014)  (0.026) (0.014) (0.025) (0.0013)  (0.0031)
Total Number of CERP   0.036***  0.082*** 0.032*** 0.076*** 0.0037*** 0.0057**
Projects  (0.011)  (0.022) (0.011) (0.021) (0.0011)  (0.0025)
Panel B. Attacks on Coalition   Attacks Levels Day time Attacks Night Time Attacks
 Forces  9.71 5.00 2.73
Number of Labor-Intensive   0.14  0.80*** 0.15 0.62*** -0.0058  0.18**
Projects  (0.26)  (0.29) (0.18) (0.22) (0.093)  (0.083)
Total Number of CERP   -0.24  -0.75*** -0.21 -0.58*** -0.022  -0.17**
Projects  (0.22)  (0.25) (0.15) (0.19) (0.078)  (0.071)
Method of Estimation  OLS  IV OLS IV OLS  IV
Areas of Responsibility  6  6 6 6 6  6
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the area of responsibility level (AOR) reported in parentheses.  Estimates that are significant at the 
0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are denoted with a ** (*, ***).  Civilian attacks are defined as any attack resulting in at least one civilian 
casualty.  Data on civilian attacks based on the Iraqi Body Counts.  Military incidents are defined as any significant action against 
Coalition Forces.  Data on military incidents based on SIGACTS database provided by the Princeton Empirical Study of Conflict 
Project (Berman, Felter, Shapiro, 2008).  Dependent variables are scaled to be per 10,000 inhabitants with population estimates based 
on World Food Program Household Survey (2007). Labor intensive projects include construction projects, refurbishment projects, 
employment projects, and public works.  All specifications include district and month-year fixed effects.  In IV specifications, the 
excluded instrument F-Statistic = 20.91 